Call for Papers

Conflict Management in the Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 1200-1600:
Actors, Institutions and Practices of Dispute Settlement
Law Faculty, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam / Institute for History, Universiteit Leiden Amsterdam and Leiden
24-25 May 2019
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SFB Working Papers nun auch online verfügbar

Die SFB 1095 Working Papers von Andreas Fahrmeir, Hartmut Leppin, Iwo Amelung und Moritz Epple sind nun online zum Download verfügbar. →LINK

Forschungsprogramm des SFB 1095

Die Aneignung und Verteilung von Ressourcen stellt eine zentrale Herausforderung der Gegenwart dar. Zur Sicherung der eigenen Existenz und für das Ergreifen von Entwicklungschancen müssen sich Akteure bei all ihren Handlungen Ressourcen bedienen, wobei der Zugriff auf Ressourcen die Möglichkeit künftiger Zugriffe einschränkt, was Anlass wiederkehrender Konflikte ist. An dieser Stelle besteht eine Herausforderung für die Wissenschaft: Wie thematisieren Akteure ihre Lage und welchen Stellenwert hat dabei der Umgang mit Ressourcen? Wie sprechen Akteure über Mangel und Defizienz? Im SFB 1095 erfolgt der Zugang zu solchen Fragen anhand von Schwächediskursen. Welchen Einfluss Schwächediskurse auf den Umgang mit Ressourcen haben, auf welche Weise also Selbstbeschreibungen und Selbstwahrnehmungen von Akteuren Eingang in den Ressourcengebrauch finden, wie durch solche Diskurse Forderungen an andere formuliert werden und wie solche Diskurse identitätsstiftend wirken, sind Kernfragen des Frankfurter SFBs 1095 Schwächediskurse und Ressourcenregime. Mehr… →



MitarbeiterInnen am SFB

Dr. Jenny Hestermann: „The ‚decline’ of Europe and the European integration: European and non-European discourses of weakness since the 1950s“

Since 2010 everyone is talking about the crisis, or better various crises, of Europe. Diagnoses, forecasts and proposals for solutions are frequently discussed in politics and the media, quite often in a shrill way. But the current ongoing debates are far from being the first discourse of crisis in European history in the 20th century. The open expression of worries about Europe’s decline which was a famous trope in culture, politics, philosphy in the Weimarer Republic, did not come to an end with the different ways of “Integration” after the Second World War- rather the opposite. And what do the protagonists even mean when they talk about "Europe"? An idea, a geographical space, a cipher for civilization, its institutions? 

In our project we examine the national discourses of Europe’s weakness and their transnational entanglements through the main examples of Great Britain and (West-) Germany for the period from the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957 to the 21st century through selected moments in time, focusing on the ideological and intellectual components of these debates. Assuming that crises provoke innovation and creativity, the mobilization of resources and the building of resource regimes through European integration is a central research question. By including discourses in Israel about European developments and the own ongoing attempts of association with the new structures into the research, the selfconception of „Europe“ will be mirrored by an historically closely intertwined actor from the „outside“ and thus situated in a larger global frame.

Jenny Hestermann, Der „Niedergang Europas“: Schwächediskurse zur Mobilisierung von Ressourcen  (A 05)

SFB- Abschlusskonferenz: Discourses of weakness and the futures of societies

Reflecting one’s own weakness and putting it into words almost always includes a certain amount of willingness to change. Or, to put it the other way round: for a historical formation, the willingness to develop its own abilities or to find new orientations towards the future quite often is linked to the establishment of a variety of discourses of weakness. 

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SFB-Abschlusskonferenz: Keynote by Prof. Joel Mokyr (Northwestern)

Is secular stagnation a real concern? We should start with the observation that in the long run secular stagnation has been historically the “normal” situation. Most economies of the past “stagnated” in the sense that their growth rates were zero or negligible; growth has become the norm only in the past two centuries in the West, and for an even shorter period in Asia and elsewhere. In asking the question whether it would be possible that the clock be turned back and return to the stagnation of the past, we need to ask why sustained growth was absent through most of human history and what factors were responsible for the phase transition that turned the world from a stationary (stagnant)  state to one of sustained growth. I isolate three factors: population dynamics, rent-seeking, and limitations on human knowledge. All three of those are no longer in force. Long-run (secular) stagnation is therefore highly unlikely even if measured GDP growth rates may fluctuate. Yet this prediction is contingent on institutional and political factors being aligned with technological progress, which is becoming increasingly questionable. 



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